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Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience
by
LUCIE WHITE*
In June of 1991 Professor Anthony Alfieri published Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice in the centennial issue of the Yale Law Journal.'
His essay is at once a subtle reflection on his own practice and an effort to
theorize more generally about poverty advocacy. In the year since the
essay was published, it has been read widely by law students and their
teachers. It has offered these readers a model for how the "theoretics" of
practice might be carried out. This Comment is a brief reflection on Pro-
fessor Alfieri's essay. It seeks to suggest, rather than comprehensively
examine, some of the risks-the silences-that his essay unwittingly im-
poses. I write not so much to criticize a single essay as to endorse a way
of theorizing that continually, and collectively, puts into question the as-
sumptions that even our best efforts to do theory take for granted.
In his essay Professor Alfieri explores how our day to day habits as
poverty advocates, our ways of seeing, hearing, and responding to our
clients, all too often have the ironic-indeed perverse-effect of re-
pressing the capacities and aspirations of the very people and communi-
ties we seek to help. Alfieri argues that as poverty lawyers we too often
perceive, and thereby construct, clients as passive, dependent recipients
of our services, rather than savvy and often subversive individuals who
have learned to survive in a hostile world. Professor Alfieri is careful to
focus his critique on common routines of poverty law practice, routines
that are embedded in the broad institutional structures of legal aid for the
poor; he does not question the good will of the people who, like Alfieri
himself, have practiced poverty law. Yet in spite of the author's careful
focus, the essay speaks to deep feelings of conflict, indeed of tragedy,
among poverty lawyers, feelings that sometimes seem an inescapable part
of the job.2
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law. B.A. 1972,
Radcliffe College; J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School.
1. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
2. See, eg., Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, I D.C. L.J.
(forthcoming 1992).
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Professor Alfieri does not undertake his critique gratuitously.
Rather, in contrast to the tradition of "trashing" in the early critical legal
studies literature,3 Alfieri writes with a clear reconstructive goal. He
wisely admits that poverty lawyers cannot easily "break out" of the
prison-house4 of their routines of practice, and the taken-for-granted de-
scriptions of their clients that give those routines their common sense.
He wisely admits that advocates cannot invent a new tradition of poverty
law practice out of whole cloth. Yet he claims that we can transform our
practice, at least at its margins, by approaching the work with four
themes in mind. He argues that "suspicion," "metaphor," "collabora-
tion," and "play" can help poverty advocates reshape the most deeply
entrenched traditions of poverty law practice.5
Such themes sound repeatedly in the recent scholarship about pov-
erty law practice that is the occasion for this symposium.6 Gerald L6pez
was one of the first writers to seek a new approach to change-focused
advocacy, in his "rebellious" alternative to the "regnant," or dominant,
approach to poverty law.7 L6pez has since been joined by others in the
painstaking work of documenting what this alternative might look like in
the harsh landscapes where poor people and their lawyer-allies work.8
Alfieri's essay furthers that collective effort.
Yet Alfieri's work stands out in this emerging scholarship in one
respect. Much of this new advocacy literature is rigorously committed to
a situated theoretical practice 9-to the slow learning that comes from
multiple, partial perspectives, from uncertain readings by advocates of
their own day to day work. In this view, the project of doing theory is
3. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984) (defending the rhetoric
and strategy of "trashing" in critical legal studies scholarship).
4. See FREDRIC JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT
OF STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM (1972).
5. Alfieri, supra note 1, at 2134.
6. In addition to the other works in this volume, see the works that Professor Alfieri
cites in footnote 42 of his article.
7. L6pez contrasts these two approaches to poverty advocacy. In the "regnant" ap-
proach, the lawyer positions himself as an expert, and sets out singlehandedly to solve the
problems of the poor. In the alternative, or "rebellious," approach, lawyers and other "outsid-
ers" see themselves as allies or collaborators with poor communities in a collective project that
draws on the full range of skills and competencies of all the group's members. These concepts
will be explained and illustrated in much greater depth in L6pez's forthcoming book, THE
REBELLIOUS IDEA OF LAWYERING AGAINST SUBORDINATION (forthcoming 1992).
8. One excellent example of this new contextualized scholarship is Austin Sarat, '.
The Law is All Over" Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
9. For theoretical discussion of a situated theoretical practice, see RENATO ROSALDO,
CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1989); Gerald L6pez, The
Well-Defended Legal Academic Identity (unpublished manuscript, on file with author, 1990).
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itself "reconstructed" into a collective practice. Rather than a task re-
served to scholars, theory becomes a habit of ongoing conversational re-
flection about how to describe the problems, make alliances, devise
strategies, and thus move together toward a better world. Theory is the
ongoing practice of reflection among the communities of poor people and
their allies that are constituted by the work they come together to do.10
This kind of theoretical practice does not yield the static artifacts, the
articles and books, that we have learned to equate with "theory."
Rather, this kind of theoretical practice is enacted in those elusive mo-
ments of insight that mark good conversations, or in those tactical inno-
vations that work. This kind of theoretical practice could be "written
up," finally, only in a situated, reflective history of the practice itself.
Alfieri's essay, in contrast, seems to picture the making of theory in
a very different way. He seems to envision theoretical work as the bring-
ing of static, prepackaged insights to poverty lawyers from a perspective
that is curiously freed from the concrete engagement, the partiality, and
hence the ambiguity of its own vantage-point. In doing this kind of the-
ory, Alfleri seems driven by a sense of impatience. Understandably dis-
tressed by the "historical failure of poverty law traditions to countenance
the values and to design effective methods of client and community em-
powerment,"'" he seeks, singlehandedly, to produce a body of prescrip-
tive knowledge that might jar poverty lawyers out of their old routines.
This kind of "theory"-impatient, imperative-conceals or represses at
the same time that it appears to enlighten and enable. This is a lesson
that Jacques Derrida has taught us through much of his work. He has
taught of the hazards that follow when one seeks to pass over the
counterpropositions that are suppressed by every theoretical pronounce-
ment one might make:
all the propositions carry within themselves a counterproposition:
sometimes virtual, sometimes very explicit, always readable, this
counterproposition signals what I will caU... a double edge and a
double bind, the singular artifact of a blade and a knot. 12
10. For two accounts of this process at work, see JACQUELINE LEAVIrr & SUSAN
SAEGERT, FROM ABANDONMENT TO HOPE: COMMUNITY HOUSEHOLDS IN HARLEM (1990)
(providing an account of the situated "theorizing" of members of impoverished "community-
households" in Harlem), and Lucie White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 278 (1990-91) (providing an account of collective reflection by a group of so-called
"homeless" people and advocates in Los Angeles).
11. Alfieri, supra note 1, at 2120.
12. Jacques Derrida, Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man's War,
in MEMOIRES: FOR PAUL DE MAN 155, 180 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1989).
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If we lose patience with the slow, dialogic13 exploration of the collective
practices in which we are embedded, and leap toward an imperial, imper-
ative style of doing theory, we risk repeating within our own theories the
very "interpretive violence" that our theories seek to move us beyond.
Professor Alfieri goes to great lengths in his essay to avoid the dan-
ger of speaking in a single, abstract, imperative theoretical voice. He lets
us hear the words of his client. He walks us through his encounter with
her in great detail. Yet in the end, these efforts prove ineffective to
counter the message that is locked into the essay's formal structure and
underlying conception. In spite of his gestures toward a dialogic, situ-
ated, open-ended exploration of his own practice, the essay leaps toward
certainty, closure-Narrative Authority. It repeatedly betrays an im-
pulse to tell us what to do. In spite of the author's professed intentions,
the essay tries to reach further than its basis in self-reflection can sup-
port. The essay seems too willing to speak for others, rather than
presenting one person's experience so that others might think more
deeply about their own. It seems too willing to project the author's in-
sights about his own practice onto the work of other advocates, and to
project the author's own images of his clients' aspirations onto their
souls. Contrary to Professor Alfieri's intentions, the essay too often slips
from the "edge," the paradox, on which any "theoretics" of
emancipatory advocacy in "impoverished communities" must stay
poised. 14
That edge can best be recovered by searching out one of the
"counterpropositions" that Alfieri's essay has repressed. Alfieri shows
how poverty lawyers do "interpretive" violence in the ways they imagine,
perceive, address, and respond to their clients. Their traditions and prac-
tices have the unintended effect of rendering their clients as dependent,
passive objects of the lawyers' professional expertise. He explains that
his concept of "violence" "is not intended to denote acts of physical vio-
lence."15 Rather, interpretive violence is a metaphor, deployed to "sum-
marize[ ] interpretive practices destructive of client narrative
meaning." 16 Yet the violent interpretive practices of poverty advocates
are themselves embedded in worlds where other violent practices, many
of them not so "metaphorical," pervade people's lives.
13. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88) (providing a monologic
theoretical justification for the need for a dialogic theory/practice of poverty law).
14. See Lucie White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 863-64 (1990).
15. Alfieri, supra note 1, at 2118 n.36.
16. Id.
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These "other" violent practices are so common in poor communities
that they are often invisible, taken for granted, by the "outside" world.
The violence is often race-linked, designed to impress the horror of past
atrocities on contemporary communities. 17 Sometimes the violence is
more private, but equally devastating. Retaliation, for instance, in the
form of firings, evictions, or the termination of welfare claims, is rou-
tinely directed against people in impoverished communities who dare
speak out. 18 When people are living on the margin, such retaliation
translates into the physical and psychic assaults of homelessness, hunger,
and rage.
A recurring theme in the feminist and critical race theory that Pro-
fessor Alfieri cites is that "real" violence is central in exacting the sys-
tematic silence of all women, and of women and men of color. 19 The
physical violence of lynching, rape, incest, battery, the psychic violence
of hate speech, the economic violence of retaliation-eviction, discharge,
welfare termination-these may not seem very subtle or sophisticated
from the perspective of continental discourse theory.20 Yet from the
point of view of people who live and work in impoverished communities,
these direct forms of violence present an overwhelming barrier, a barrier
17. See, eg., Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing ofMr. G., 38 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 34 & n.98 (1990) (noting how a creek in
an impoverished African American community still bore the name "Nigger-head" in the early
1980s, to mark the site of a lynching).
18. This observation is repeatedly confirmed in my personal experience, and by the re-
ports of poor people with whom I have worked. To my knowledge, there are no reliable
empirical data about the scope of retaliation in impoverished communities. Regina Austin has
collected data on subtle practices that inflict emotional distress on low level workers, but these
data do not focus specifically on retaliation. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker
Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1, 20-
49 (1988); see also JAMES C. Scorr, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN
TRANSCRIPTS (1990) (describing indirect speech practices that subordinated groups devise to
protect themselves against retaliation for expressing their feelings more forthrightly).
19. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sex and Violence: A Perspective, in FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED: DIsCouRsES ON LIFE AND LAW 85-93 (1987) (emphasizing the central
role of sex-based violence, such as rape, battery, and incest, in silencing women); KimberI6
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment! Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1358-59 (1988) (critiquing early critical
legal studies analyses of racism for their failure to take full account of the role of real violence,
as opposed to ideological mystification, in suppressing communities of people of color); Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2320, 2332-35 (1989) (noting the link between racist speech and physical violence against com-
munities of color); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomeno-
logical Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 94 (1987) (arguing that
women redefine themselves in response to the pervasive threat of physical violence they face).
20. For a survey of the range of theories to which I refer, see sources cited by Fraser and
Palmer, infra note 21.
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preventing people from speaking out in any but the most guarded, most
constrained ways if they are serious about their own survival.
Several theorists, all of them thoughtful critics of Foucault, warn of
the risks inherent in theorizing about "interpretive" violence.21 This is a
danger that Professor Alfieri does not fully escape. In order to define a
concept of "interpretive violence," he must create a dichotomy between
his "metaphor" of "interpretive violence" and a "real" violence-the ac-
tual conduct of violent acts-to which his metaphor is opposed.22 After
constructing this dichotomy, Alfieri's story emphasizes the metaphor,
and thereby devalues the opposite pole. Thus, the essay unwittingly
works to de-emphasize the "actual conduct of violent acts" in poor com-
munities. It turns our attention away from cops kicking poor people-
with boots and with racist slurs-and of landlords locking them out. By
repressing these images, Professor Alfieri's story has the ironic effect of
doing precisely what it seeks to avoid. His story of lawyers' interpretive
"violence" shifts our attention away from these other kinds of violence.
His admonition that we listen for stories of dignity and power from our
clients, as well-founded as this advice may be, renders us less attentive
when a client attempts to name for us the violence that threatens her
life.23
Professor Alfieri should not be faulted for the "violence" done by
his essay; that risk is entailed by any monologic, abstract approach to
theoretical work. He cannot avoid the risk by rejecting discourse-aware-
21. See BRYAN D. PALMER, DESCENT INTO DISCOURSE: THE REIFICATION OF LAN-
GUAGE AND THE WRITING OF SOCIAL HISTORY (1990); Nancy Fraser, Foucault on Modem
Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion, in UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DIS-
COURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 17-34 (1989); Nancy Fraser, The
Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics (1989) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with author); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights" An Essay for Robert Cover,
96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1897-1900 (1987); Robin L. West, Feminism, Social Theory, and Law
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (exploring the risks of Foucault's theory of
power for feminist politics). Joan Scott and Linda Gordon have recently engaged in a feminist
debate over the place of discourse critique in social theory in an exchange of reviews of their
most recent books. See Joan W. Scott, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of
Family Violence by Linda Gordon, 15 SIGNS 848 (1990) (book review); Linda Gordon, Re-
sponse to Scott, 15 SIGNS 852 (1990); Linda Gordon, Gender and the Politics of History by Joan
Wallach Scott, 15 SIGNS 853 (1990) (book review); Joan W. Scott, Response to Gordon, 15
SIGNS 859 (1990).
22. See Alfieri, supra note 1, at 2118 n.36 (distinguishing the metaphor of interpretive
violence from "acts of physical violence").
23. In my oral comment at the symposium, I described several examples from my ovn
current work, in which clients spoke only with great reluctance about experiences of sexual,
economic, or racial violence that threatened their lives. A more detailed account of some of
these experiences is forthcoming in Lucie White, Speaking Truth to Power: Violence, Despair,
and Healing Spaces in Poor Women's Lives, 1992 WISC. L. REv. (forthcoming).
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ness and shifting his focus from "interpretive" violence to the "actual"
violence in the "real" world. As his philosophical mentors show us, he
will find no firm footing in the quicksand of "the real world." The chal-
lenge, rather, is to critique the "violence" we inflict through language
without thereby creating a dichotomy, a hierarchy, 24 that privileges this
"interpretive" violence and thereby represses the violence of blood.
This path-this edge-will reveal itself only through a less impa-
tient practice of theory: the situated piece-work 25 of reflecting together
as we get on with our work. Only such contextualized reflection can plot
the paradox of interpretive/corporal violence, tracing how the subordi-
nating power of "real" violence comes from its social meaning, and how
disempowering traditions of law practice arise from, and enhance, the
violence imposed by guns and knives. The task is to tell stories that re-
veal how "literal violence" cannot be experienced separately from the
power/knowledge regimes in which it is embedded, and how "interpre-
tive violence" cannot be disentangled from the threat, and the execution,
of corporal violation.
Professor Alfieri's essay teaches the powerful lesson that we lawyers
cannot "empower" impoverished communities by fitting clients into our
own strategic or theoretical schemes. Rather, we must ally with embat-
tled communities and seek ways to support people's efforts to empower
themselves. Yet the essay also enacts the lesson it purports to teach. It
shows that, in their impatience to theorize their own practice, lawyer-
theorists like Professor Alfieri risk usurping from poor people and their
advocates the power to name the very forms of violence that pose the
most formidable barriers to their empowerment.
24. Jacques Derrida, for one, has astutely described the processes of language through
which dichotomies effect patterns of hierarchy between the two contrasting terms. See, eg.,
JACQUES DERRIDA, WRrrING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978).
25. See L6pez, supra note 9 (describing all academic work as "piece-work" in a collective
institutional practice).
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